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Corporate Governance and Firm Strategy in the Pharmaceutical Industry
by Steven Casper and Catherine Matraves
Using the case of the pharmaceutical industry, this paper assesses how the leading
German and UK firms are adapting to changes in their competitive environment, at both
the national and international level.  We attempt to link how firms create governance
structures (management decision-making, the organisation of the R&D process, etc.),
and the national system of innovation, impact the innovation strategies adopted in leading
German and UK firms.  Our results show that first, the firm competencies created in
order to compete globally may still originate within national economies, in part because
the generation of R&D remains relatively national.  Second, towards the end of the
1970s, the scientific basis in the pharmaceutical industry began to change rapidly.  The
evidence presented shows that UK firms rapidly developed new competencies in
biotechnology and other research areas in response to the structural changes.  However,
German firms tended, until very recently, to maintain and in some cases strengthen
competencies in traditional research methods based on organic chemistry.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Corporate Governance und Unternehmensstrategie in der pharmazeutischen
Industrie
Am Beispiel der pharmazeutischen Industrie wird in diesem Beitrag aufgezeigt, wie füh-
rende deutsche und britische Firmen sich an Änderungen in ihrer Unternehmensumwelt
anpassen, sowohl der nationalen wie auch der internationalen Umwelt. Es wird gezeigt,
wie die Unternehmen Governance-Strukturen (Managemententscheidungen, die Organi-
sation von FuE-Prozessen etc.) schaffen und wie nationale Innovationssysteme die Inno-
vationsstrategien beeinflussen, die von führenden deutschen und britischen Firmen ver-
folgt werden. Erstens gelangt die Studie zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Kompetenz der
Unternehmen so ausgerichtet wurde, daß sie für den globalen Wettbewerb fit sind, aber
ihre Wurzeln dennoch innerhalb der nationalen Volkswirtschaften behalten, teilweise
deshalb, weil FuE verhältnismäßig national fundiert ist. Zweitens begann zum Ende der
siebziger Jahre eine dramatische Änderung in der wissenschaftlichen Basis der pharma-
zeutischen Industrie. Diese Evidenz zeigt, daß britische Firmen rasch neue Kompetenz in
Biotechnologie und anderen Forschungsbereichen entwickelten, um auf die Änderungen
zu reagieren. Deutsche Unternehmen tendierten jedoch noch bis vor kurzem dazu, ihre
bisherige Kompetenz beizubehalten und in manchen Fällen in traditionellen Forschungs-
bereichen, basierend auf organischer Chemie, sogar zu verstärken.1. Introduction
In recent years, the question of how firms are organised and the resulting impact on
product market strategies has become increasingly important.  Commercial activity is not
spread evenly across nations (Porter, 1990).  Firms in the US and UK, for example, have
tended to excel in high technology industries where the pace of innovation is very rapid
and technological paradigms are shifting (Soskice, 1994).  Examples include
biotechnology, software, and network communications.  German companies, by contrast,
seem unable to successfully compete in these high-technology fields, but are very
successful in established science-based industries such as traditional pharmaceuticals, as
well as a number of high-quality manufacturing sectors such as machine-tools (Streeck,
1992; Katzenstein, 1989).  An emerging literature explains cross-national variation in
firm characteristics and their product market strategies as the result of differences in
national institutional frameworks (Aoki, 1990; Hollingsworth, 1997; Soskice, 1994,
forthcoming).
This paper considers these issues within the context of the pharmaceutical industry,
which is an interesting case in that it is one of the few high technology industries where
European firms are competitive in the global market place (Sharp and Patel, 1996;
Panorama, 1996).
1  The main objective of the paper is to assess how the leading German
and UK pharmaceutical firms are adapting to changes in their competitive environment,
at both the national and international level, with particular emphasis on the links between
corporate governance institutions, national systems of innovation and product market
competition.  During the 1980s, UK pharmaceutical firms substantially outperformed
their German competitors in adjusting to changing industry dynamics.  The paper links
the relative success of the UK pharmaceutical industry to differences in national
institutional frameworks in the two countries.
To provide a brief introduction to the competitive process in pharmaceuticals, first
observe that this industry is characterised by dynamic competition.  New products (and
also processes) are continuously being introduced.  Unlike basic chemicals, say, where
innovation is rather more incremental and new products displace the old upon
introduction, the pharmaceutical industry is better characterised as an example of a
radically innovative industry.  The firm’s main goal is to introduce a new chemical entity
(NCE) in an existing or new therapeutic market.  Second, and importantly, competition
is truly global.  The results from R&D are easily transferable across national borders,
with perhaps some local modification necessary to comply with the
standards/regulations.  In other words, the results from R&D can be exploited anywhere
in the world, although note that the generation of R&D remains far less international
(Patel, 1995).  However, the competencies which firms must create in order to compete
                                               
1  Sectoral comparisons of innovative performance between Europe, Japan and the US show the
strength of pharmaceuticals, where Europe’s capabilities were developed in the late nineteenth century.2
globally, and the rules by which markets are organised, may originate within national
economies.  In part because the generation of R&D currently remains relatively national,
although this is changing, we argue that leading firms’ competencies will still be
influenced by national institutional frameworks.
Towards the end of the 1970s, the scientific basis in the pharmaceutical industry began to
change rapidly.  The evidence presented in this paper shows that UK firms rapidly
developed new competencies in biotechnology and other research areas in response to
the structural changes.  However, German firms tended rather more, until very recently,
to maintain and in some cases strengthen competencies in traditional research methods
based on organic chemistry.  We attempt to link how firms create governance structures
(management decision-making, the organisation of the R&D process, etc.), and the
national system of innovation, impact the innovation strategies adopted in leading
German and UK pharmaceutical firms.
In section two, we first summarise the national market characteristics of the
pharmaceutical industry from the early 1980s to the present day.  Second, section two
examines how exogenous structural changes have affected the competitive environment
beginning during the late 1970s.  We consider the substantial rise in R&D expenditure,
the increasing importance of the marketing and distribution networks, the increasing use
of external sources of knowledge (research joint ventures, mergers, and acquisitions) and
their resulting impact on the threshold size of the firm.  Section three first analyses the
importance of the typical patterns of firm organisation in the UK and Germany and
secondly, shows how national institutional frameworks play a role in aiding firms to build
specific competencies.  Section four, using interview evidence for the most part, applies
this framework to show the implications for and the actual differences in strategies
across German and UK firms.  Finally, Section five summarises and concludes.
2. Market Structure and Competitive Dynamics
This section first summarises the aggregate market characteristics for the five largest
pharmaceutical producing nations, as shown in Table 1 below.  Using several summary
measures, we can construct a picture of a given nation’s competitive position at the
beginning of the 1990s.  We particularly emphasise the trends in the UK and German
respective competitive positions.  We look at R&D expenditure, patent trends, NCEs,
number of products in the Top 50, and firm market share in the US.  We include the
number of products in the Top 50 to account for the fact that although some NCEs
introduced are genuinely original, others may be marginal improvements only which
could then make the NCE figures somewhat misleading.  We include firm market share in
the US as a crude measure of competitiveness, because the US market is the most open
and competitive market in the world.3
To first give the overall summary, the data show that the US is the largest domestic
market in the world (although total EU market size was $47.7 billion in 1987 and $88.8
billion in 1993).  Mark-ups were highest, on average, in Japan and lowest in the UK;
note that Japan was, until recently, an extremely regulated protected domestic market.
Table 1 also shows that there exist variations in health expenditure between countries.
Health expenditure as a percentage of GDP is highest in the US, and the gap is widening
over time between the US and other nations.  The US also has by far the lowest
proportion of health expenditure funded by public sources.  In 1989, the EU average for
funding by public sources was 66%, so France lies below the average, with both
Germany and the UK above the average.
Table 1 shows that the US pharmaceutical industry is strongest.  The US has the highest
R&D expenditure, the largest introduction of NCEs, and also, the products from its firms
dominate the Top 50.  Although Japan substantially increased its proportion of NCEs in
the 1981-1990 period, evidence shows that if the number of breakthrough NCEs is
considered, then between 1970-1983, US firms developed 42% whereas Japanese firms
only developed 4% (Ballance et al, 1992; Thomas, 1996).
2  The trends in patenting
activities show that among the EU member states, there has been a slight decline over
time in patenting activities in the US, with a slight rise for Japan.  Thus, Japanese
pharmaceutical firms, unlike in electronics, for example, are not competitive in the US
market place.
Consider now the summary of the UK and German ‘national strength’ aggregate
measures.  The success story in the EU has been the rise of the UK in the 1980s.  Its
leading firm, Glaxo, for example, rose from 17th in the world in terms of sales in 1983,
to 1st in the world in 1995.  We have observed a relative increase in R&D expenditure in
the UK, and furthermore, its companies are extremely good at developing NCEs that are
commercially successful.  During the 1981-1990 period, only 28 new drugs were
developed, but a relatively high percentage of these turned into blockbusters.  Germany,
on the other hand, has a much weaker position.  It developed far more drugs (67 NCEs
between 1981 and 1990), spends approximately the same amount on R&D, but has a
very low number of blockbusters to account for this (only 5 in 1990).
3  As a final
measure of international competitiveness. Germany’s share of the US market is only
                                               
2   Looking at R&D expenditures note that in 1983, the lowest R&D to sales ratio was in Japan which
was a protected domestic market, although between 1983 and 1992, expenditure did substantially rise.
3   In 1993 (Matraves, 1996), Glaxo (UK) had the highest R&D expenditure worldwide at $1.3 billion,
was operating in several therapeutic areas, with 6 Top 50 products, including the number one, Zantac
(gastro-intestinal).  SmithKline Beecham (SKB, UK) spent $743.5 million on R&D, with 4 Top 50
products, including Tagamet (gastro-intestinal).  Note that in Table 1, SKB’s 3 best-selling drugs are
credited to both the US and the UK as the company is of joint ownership.  Hoechst (Ger) spent $967
million on R&D but had no products in the Top 50, albeit a relatively strong position in cardiovascular
drugs and anti-infectives.  Bayer (Ger) spent $723.5 million on R&D and had two products in the Top
50, including Cipro (anti-infectives).  Note that R&D works with a lag, so it may be that we will see
German firms becoming more research productive in a few years.4
Table 1: International Comparison of Market Characteristics
USA Japan Ger France UK
Market size ($ bn)
1987 39.3 30.2 11.8 10.2   8.2
1993 70.8 51.1 19.5 17.1 14.9
Mark-ups
(1970-1992) 1.44 1.54 1.45 1.04 1.16
Health Expenditure (% GDP)
1980    9.3 6.4 8.4 7.6 5.6
1994 13.5 6.9 9.5 9.7 6.9
% funded by public source
1989 10 85 73 64 78
R&D Intensity (%)
1983 10.6 6.7 8.4 7.1 11.7
1992 14.3 9.8 9.2 8.7 16.3
New Chemical Entities (NCEs)
1971-80 154   74   91   98   29
1981-90 142 129   67   37   28
No. of products in Top 50
1985 23 5 5 1   9
1990 27 2 5 0 12
Patent trends
1980-84 49.8 13.3 10.4 5.1 7.5
1990-94 54.6 14.7   7.8 4.7 5.3
Firm’s market share in the US
1991 70.2 0.3 4.6 1.2 14.6
Source: unless explicitly stated, the source is Sharp and Patel, 1996.  R&D intensity is
measured as a percentage of gross output; patent trends are measured as the distribution
of US patents granted to innovators from different countries.  Mark-ups (Martins,
Scarpetta and Pilat, 1996): estimated using Roeger’s method.  Market size (Matraves,
1997): ‘value of production’ taken from the OECD ‘Industrial Structure Statistics’,
accounting for ethical pharmaceuticals only.  The dollar conversion was made using the
nominal average exchange rate (OECD Outlook, June 1994).  Global market size was
measured at $135.5 billion (1987) and $239.5 billion (1993).
4.6%, compared to 14.6% for the UK.
Having provided a brief summary of aggregate market characteristics in the
pharmaceutical industry, this section now goes on to examine exogenous structural
changes observed over the past two decades.  Beginning in the late 1970s, competitive
industry dynamics have become more complex.  This was due to radical changes in the
nature of the innovation process and the introduction of new marketing and distribution5
techniques.  We will later link the differences in the performance of UK and German
pharmaceutical firms, as highlighted above, to their ability to react to these changes in
the competitive environment.
(i) the nature of the technological process: over the last twenty years, the development
of biotechnology has fundamentally changed how drugs are discovered.  The traditional
methodology, prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s when knowledge about the properties of
the compounds that could be used to synthesise new drugs was still lacking, screened
thousands of chemical compounds for efficacy against a given disease (Schwartzman,
1976).  In the 1970s, basic biomedical knowledge increased;  the traditional methodology
has been replaced by ‘rational drug design’, i.e., the development of more precise models
of how particular diseases function, and the design of molecules designed to target
particular cells or cause particular biological interactions within the body (see Werth,
1995; Powell, 1996: 204).  Biotechnology is beginning to displace traditional ‘chemical’
capabilities.
4
When such a new research methodology is adopted, it may be the case that
organisational rigidity and inertia hinder incumbents’ ability to take advantage of new
opportunities.  However, although the discovery process is changing, the assets needed
for development and commercialisation are not, and these assets continue to be owned
by the largest firms.  As in any industry, the pharmaceutical industry comprises a value-
chain of clusters of organisational, capital, and human resource competencies in areas
such as research, development, production, marketing, distribution, etc.  In
pharmaceuticals, some processes in this value chain, such as manufacturing, are generic
activities with low value-added.  As research is one of the highly specialised and hence
value-added processes, the fact that most biotechnological research is taking place within
small start-up firms rather than large firms is an important change (see Powell, 1996).
5
However, the vast majority of start-ups are crucially dependent on large pharmaceutical
firms.  This is leading to interesting networks of agreements being observed, where the
biotech firms supply the ideas, etc., and the larger firms supply the complementary
specialised assets (to use Teece’s (1986) terminology) such as development, financing,
obtaining regulatory approval, and finally marketing, that allow them to appropriate most
of the gains from innovation.
To develop this further, the cost of developing a single new drug is currently about $350
                                               
4   Biotechnology is based primarily on recombinant DNA and cell fusion techniques.  In the
pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology is used in 3 different ways: i) to produce drugs and vaccines
using rDNA technology; ii) to make intelligent screens for new compounds; and iii) to apply techniques
for rational drug design by understanding molecular structure.
5   It must be pointed out, of course, that although new start-ups may be undertaking proportionately
more R&D, the leading firms still spend by far the largest amount, in absolute terms, on R&D.  The
leading Top 20 firms in the world control approximately 50% of pharmaceutical sales and 95% of R&D
expenditure (Grabowski and Vernon, 1994a).6
million (Pisano and Wheelwright, 1995; Di Masi et al., 1991); only a small proportion is
spent in basic research (current estimates are approximately 10%, PhRMA 1997).  Once
compounds are discovered/designed, most development and virtually all marketing and
distribution is undertaken by large pharmaceutical firms.  Basic research results are
usually not known for several years, so securing financing is a crucial problem for most
start-ups.  As a result, many biotech firms license all or part of their results to the large
pharmaceutical firm in return for working capital.
6  The existence of hundreds of
specialised research firms increases the flexibility of large firms, and as long as they can
appropriate most of the commercial gains from bio-medical research, then established
firms have important reasons to support and engage independent third party research
networks.
Also, by nurturing third party research, established firms may better diversify risk.  It is
estimated that only 1 compound from an initial 5,000 will be successfully developed
(PhRMA, 1997).  R&D costs have also substantially increased due to tougher regulatory
requirements in clinical trials, which accounts for approximately 70% of total
development costs (Gambardella, 1995).  If in-house research in one therapeutic area is
unsuccessful, purchasing compounds developed by third parties can help to fill gaps in
the development pipeline.  In the world of rational drug design, research in complex
disease areas usually takes place along a number of distinct research trajectories.
7  For
example, Penan (1996) identifies fifteen distinct research programmes to fight
Alzheimer’s disease, each of which is supported by a different constellation of university
departments, large pharmaceutical firms, and in some cases, biotech firms.
8  Under these
conditions, in which no one firm can monopolise a therapeutic field, the ability to scan
research becomes crucial.  Although it is still important to maintain in-house scientific
and technological capabilities for monitoring and using external knowledge, developing
licensing arrangements and research collaborations with biotech firms helps diversify the
firm’s ‘bets’ across a number of research programmes.
9
Overall, these new research opportunities imply that firms may have an incentive to
change the structure of their internal R&D activities, to broaden their activities across a
                                               
6   Doz (1992) argues that the more invisible and intangible the assets of a particular firm are, the more
beneficial the partnership will be.  However, it may be that the more the observed skills are system
embedded, collective, culturally bound, etc., the less easily they transfer.
7   Note that rational drug design also allows firms to redesign established drugs for use against other
diseases.  For example, Glaxo (UK) recently transformed one of its established AIDS drugs into a
hepatitis cure, while Eli Lilly (US) has redesigned its anti-depressant Prozac as a weight-loss drug.
Furthermore, rational drug design also simplifies the task of developing ‘me-too’ drugs that are
chemically equivalent, but do not violate patents held by other firms.
8   Furthermore, the therapies for some of the more complicated diseases, such as AIDS and perhaps
Alzheimer’s, often consist of ‘cocktails’ of two or more compounds developed through separate research
programmes.
9   Interestingly, only 5% of Merck’s R&D is carried out externally, whereas the figure is now much
higher for other leading firms (up to 20%): Financial Times (24/5/97), Economist, 1997, 60.7
larger number of therapeutic areas.  Each therapeutic area becomes a platform from
which the firm can monitor the field, purchasing promising compounds from third
parties, developing collaborative research projects with universities or research firms, or
starting in-house research projects.  In addition to increasing the ability to scan the field,
maintaining competencies in a number of therapeutic areas allows firms to better
redesign compounds for use against new diseases, develop ‘niche’ markets, and ‘me-too’
drugs.
10
However, given the massive increase in R&D costs, it may be that only the largest
multinational firms will be able to cover a wide range of therapeutic areas.
11  Also, given
the existence of knowledge spillovers (through journal publications, etc.), it may be
extremely difficult to maintain a consistently successful research competency in one
therapeutic area.
12  Although knowledge is a public good, it is not a free public good
(Pavitt, 1991; Gambardella, 1995), and internal scientific capabilities will still be
necessary for knowledge exploitation (Cockburn and Henderson, 1996).  Substitute
drugs are constantly being discovered; PhRMA, for example, estimates that the
‘exclusivity period’ before a substitute drug enters the market has decreased from 6
years in 1977 (Tagamet and Zantac) to 1 year in 1992 (Recombinate and Kogenate).
(ii) marketing and distribution networks: over recent years, large pharmaceutical
firms have spent as much money on marketing and distribution as they have on
development.
13  Until recently, marketing was dominated by the labour intensive practice
of sending thousands of ‘detailers’ to visit individual doctors, as well as some advertising
in medical journals.  However, recent pressure to increase the returns on individual
drugs, coupled with important developments in the organisation of the US
pharmaceutical market, have prompted leading firms to adopt new distribution and
marketing strategies.  Redeveloping prescription drugs into ‘over the counter’ (OTC)
                                               
10   Henderson (1994) argues that ‘random drug design’, via the screening of thousands of compounds
required relatively little communication of knowledge, either inter- or intra-firm.  However, the
changing methodology of drug discovery means that modern scientists must be skilled in a wide range of
disciplines many of which are advancing very quickly.  This has greatly increased the need for the
exchange of knowledge, both inter- and intra-firm.  Also, the IT revolution has meant that drugs can be
screened far more quickly.
11  Henderson and Cockburn (1996) assert that firms typically invest in approximately 10-15 distinct
research programmes, where each programme is targeted towards a particular disease area.
Investigating the relationship between firm size and research productivity for 10 leading firms, their
results show that larger firms are more productive, due mainly to economies of scope (the ability to
sustain an adequately diverse portfolio of research projects and to capture and use internal and external
knowledge spillovers).
12   Henderson and Cockburn (1994) argue that ‘local competencies’ (abilities necessary for everyday
problem solving) may give long-lasting advantages but firms also need ‘architectural competence’ (the
ability to develop new competencies).  Using data on cardiovascular drugs, they find that the better is
outside-firm communication, and the better are within-firm information flows across therapeutic classes,
the more research productive is the firm.  The results are consistent with their hypotheses.
13   McGahan (1994) asserts the industry as a whole spent one billion dollars more in 1991 on marketing
and distribution than on research and development.8
versions is perhaps the simplest way to extend the life of a compound nearing the end of
its patent life.  This tactic requires direct to consumer advertising through the
commercial media, as well as the development of distribution channels to retail outlets.
These marketing and distribution competencies differ dramatically from the more
traditional ‘detailing’ activities.  Pharmaceutical firms that choose the OTC route have
two options.  First, they could establish costly relationships with advertising agencies and
develop new distribution channels; or second, form marketing joint ventures (JVs) with
firms who have already developed a competency in the areas required.
14
The most important changes that have occurred in the US, however, have developed as a
result of the reorganisation of links between doctors, distributors (pharmacies), and
insurers.  During the 1980s, health care and insurance functions began to merge into
HMOs and other managed care organisations, encouraged by various reforms in the US
health care system.
15  This created networks of concentrated buyers.  Towards the end of
the 1980s, a similar fusion of pharmacy, marketing, and distribution operations began to
take place within so-called ‘pharmaceutical benefits management’ (PBM) firms.  PBMs
serve these concentrated buyer networks, partly by providing drug utilisation reviews
and other information such as drug usage rates that pharmaceutical firms can feed back
into their development and marketing activities, but more importantly, by using the
concentrated purchasing power to negotiate strong price discounts.  This is done through
managing the ‘formulary’ (the list of drugs that each doctor within a certain health care
organisation can prescribe).  In recent years, leading US pharmaceutical firms have
acquired several of the largest PBMs (see Table 2), showing evidence of forward
integration into health care markets.
16
Such forward integration complements an expansion of research across several
therapeutic areas.  While firm profits are still driven to a relatively large extent by the
control of a few ‘blockbusters’, the new distribution and marketing capacities ensure that
the life-cycle of each compound can be maximised, especially as drugs nearing patent end
are transformed into OTC versions.  Having some guaranteed market access through
controlling one or more PBMs allows leading firms to minimise the risk of not being
first, i.e., if a firm loses a ‘race’ to develop a particular treatment, it can usually produce
a ‘me-too’ drug within a few years, and assure a fixed volume of sales through the PBM.
                                               
14   Recent examples of the latter strategy include the Glaxo alliance with Warner-Lambert, and the
Merck alliance with Johnson & Johnson, to develop and market OTC versions.
15   Over 100 PBMs emerged in the US during the 1980s (McGahan, 1994); by 1996, 53 million people
were enrolled in HMOs in the US, up from 9 million in 1980.  Generic substitution is now used by 85%
of HMOs, and currently accounts for 40% of the volume of prescription pharmaceuticals.
16   The control of formularies does not mean that pharmaceutical firms can charge higher prices for
their drugs, since each HMO can choose between a number of PBMs on the basis of the price and the
availability of drugs.  Nevertheless, guaranteed market access to a large network of buyers allows
pharmaceutical firms to maximise the value of their drug portfolio; especially with respect to generics
and ‘me-too’ equivalents of branded drugs where large sales volume is crucial.9
According to a recent industry analysis, some 90% of patented drugs have direct
competitors, and there exist three or more direct competitors in 15 of the top 20
therapeutic areas (Powell, 1996: 204).
Table 2: Mergers and Acquisitions
1985 Monsanto (US) and Searle (US).
1988 Kodak (US) and Sterling (US).
1989 SmithKline Beckman (US) and Beecham (UK) merged.  Bristol-Myers (US) and
Squibb (US) merged.  Dow (Merrell) (US) and Marion (US) merged.
1990 Rhone-Poulenc (Fra) and Rorer (US) merged.  Roche (US) bought 60% of
Genentech (US) (biotech firm) for $2.1 billion.
1993 Merck (US) paid $5.9 billion for Medco (US distributor).  Synergen (US) and
Amgen (US) merged ($2.6 billion).
1994 Ciba Geigy (Ch) paid $2.1 billion for 50% of Chiron (US biotech firm).
American Home Products (US) paid $9.8 billion for American Cyanamid (US).
Roche (Ch) paid $5.1 billion for Syntex.  SmithKline Beecham (UK) paid $2.9
billion for Sterling Health (US) and resold part of it to Bayer (Ger) for $1 billion;
also bought DPS (PBM/distributor) for $2.3 bn.  Eli Lilly (US) paid $4 billion for
PCS (US distributor).
1995 Glaxo (UK) paid $14 billion for Wellcome (UK).  Hoechst (Ger) paid $7.1 billion
for Marion Merrell Dow (US).  Pharmacia (Swed) and Upjohn (US) merged.
Rhone-Poulenc (Fr) acquired Fisons (UK) for $1.7 billion and BASF (Ger)
acquired Boots (UK) for $1.3 billion.
1996 Ciba-Geigy (Ch) and Sandoz (Ch) merged forming Novartis (with an estimated
market share of 4.5%).
1997 Roche (Ch) acquired Boehringer-Mannheim (Ger).
Source: Matraves (1997)
This section has described the underlying changes in the competitive environment in the
global pharmaceutical industry.  Overall, minimal firm size is increasing due to the
increased costs of R&D, and the marketing and distribution networks necessary to
exploit the new drug globally.  An additional factor is that if the largest firms are
broadening their R&D activities, this may best be done in combination with forward
integration into new marketing and distribution networks.  Table 2 shows the extent of
the recent merger activity in the pharmaceutical industry.  Since the 1989 merger of
SmithKline with Beecham to the Ciba-Sandoz merger in 1996 forming Novartis, the
industry has been rapidly restructuring itself leading to a consolidation of firms at the
top.  Table 2 shows that this restructuring has been dominated by global (inter-regional)
activity.  What is interesting here is that the European firm is the more proactive.  The
leading firms which have been international in operation are now becoming international10
in ownership.  We now consider the question of whether national models play a role in
how firms compete globally.  Section 3 presents a framework for thinking about these
issues.
3. The importance of national models
National political economies are characterised by complexes of institutions in different
areas (e.g., industrial relations, capital markets, education and training) which firms draw
on to support particular product market strategies. National institutions represent
resources or ‘tool kits’ firms can engage to create and manage the organisational
structures needed to sustain particular competencies.  In this section, we first examine
the typical patterns of firm organisation in the UK and Germany, proposing a general
argument about building organisational competencies.  Second, we examine the role that
national innovation systems play in influencing product market strategies.  We will later
suggest the superior performance of UK firms can be linked to corporate governance
institutions that support rapid short-term adjustments to structural changes, and an
environment created by the national system of innovation that supports radical
innovation.
(i) corporate governance and large firm organisation patterns: firm structures form
the organisational context within which managers adjust their product market strategies
to compete (Bower, 1970).  Organisational structures refer to decision-making
structures, career paths, employee remuneration and other financial incentives, and also,
inter-departmental links.  To create successful product market strategies, the firm
management must create and sustain relationships with a number of different groups,
e.g., workers, technicians, scientists, banks, etc.  We view each aspect of company
organisation as a strategic response to a bundle of technical and relational problems.  The
rules chosen by top management to organise and monitor decision-making, manage
careers, reward performance, etc., influence both the type of organisational responses
that firms can adopt and the range of possible product market strategies (national and
international).
Relationship between owners and top-management: many comparisons of corporate
governance patterns within the UK and Germany focus on differences in the ability of
firms to obtain finance to make long-term investments (Charkham, 1995; Vitols, 1995a).
According to the argument, the preference for short-term returns held by capital-market
based financial systems like those seen in the UK and US force firms to limit long-term
investments.  Similarly, because most shares within Germany’s ‘bank-centred’ financial
system are directly held or controlled by large banks with no short-term liquidity option,
firms have access to ‘patient capital’ that may be used to finance long-term investments.
The ability of UK pharmaceutical firms to make long-term investments is driven by
investors using the current product portfolio and ‘future drug’ pipeline to judge both the11
likely short-term returns and long-term viability.
While we argue that differences in the composition of ownership is one of a number of
factors that create substantially different patterns of company organisation across UK
and German pharmaceutical firms, in both countries firms have been able to invest
massive amounts of funds into R&D.  In fact, Table 1 shows that UK firms not only
invested a higher percentage of R&D, but also substantially increased expenditure
between 1983 and 1992.  Although there is the risk that high R&D spending will not
yield any blockbusters, it is clear that it is one of the best predictors of long-term success.
In the short-run, investors will quickly sell shares if the firm begins to cut R&D
expenditure.
A key feature of the UK corporate governance system is that company law protects the
rights of dispersed shareholders by guaranteeing a market for corporate control. In the
UK, most large firms have a single board of directors, consisting of several non-
executive directors appointed to represent shareholders, as well as the chief executive
officer (CEO) and several other executive directors (see Charkham, 1995).
Representatives of share-holders create contracts to align the incentives of top managers
with those of owners.
17  Top managers of most large firms receive renewable short-term
contracts; non-executive directors will remove the top management team if performance
lags.  The CEO is given unilateral decision-making control, and strategic initiatives are
usually formulated within committees of top managers, approved by the CEO, and then
quickly implemented throughout the hierarchy.
In Germany, company law promotes a ‘stake-holder’ system, in which various groups of
employees in addition to owners are given a strong voice in firm management
(Charkham, 1995; Lehrer, 1997).  Company law creates a ‘two tier’ system consisting of
both a supervisory board (the Aufsichtsrat) and an executive board (Vorstand).  Under
German company law, seats on the supervisory board are equally divided between firm
employee representatives and owners representatives, with the tie-breaking vote held by
the supervisory board chairman, also an owners representative. In the German system,
power is dispersed across various ‘stake-holders’ on the supervisory board, and most
decisions are consensual.  Thus, while members of the Vorstand can be removed if their
performance is severely sub-standard, they rarely receive the unilateral decision-making
control or high-powered remuneration incentives seen in UK firms.  Finally, as major
ownership stakes are usually far more concentrated within German firms, take-overs are
rare.  Thus, major shareholders are usually not interested in short-term capital gains and
have a preference for long-term earnings and stability.  The broad academic consensus
that the German corporate governance system provides ‘patient capital’ is driven by
                                               
17   To align preferences, stock-options and share-ownership are included within remuneration packages,
where remuneration is extremely high, and is largely based on short to medium-term performance of the
share price of the company stock.12
basic differences in ownership.  While the ‘stakeholder system’ of corporate governance
is strongly driven by company law, it is likely that banks and other concentrated
stakeholders continue to support this system because it makes the patterns of company
decision-making predictable and rewards long-term planning and consensus decision-
making.
Relationships between top-managers and employees:
18 differences in the composition of
ownership, combined with company and corporate governance laws and the structure of
labour markets have led to the creation of different patterns of firm organisation.  The
firm organisational patterns we highlight include the structure of decision-making,
career-paths of managers and scientists, and remuneration policy.  These differences are
conditioned in part by the incentive structures arising from ownership differences, but
also by important differences in the structure of labour and company law in the two
countries.
UK labour markets are relatively deregulated and open.  This makes implicit long-term
contracts with low-powered performance incentives less viable.  There exists a market
for managers and technical employees; courts will not uphold ‘competition clauses’ in
employment contracts that limit future employment; and poaching is widespread.
Furthermore, top management has more flexibility over internal labour market policy.  If
particular corporate units are not meeting expected performance standards or, due to a
change in strategy, are no longer needed, they may simply be cut.
19  While in practice,
many middle managers and researchers will work with one firm throughout their careers,
there are usually no long-term employment guarantees.  Although top managers have a
mandate to invest heavily in long-term R&D, they must contribute to measurable equity
value creation, in terms of current profitability and/or share price, which also tends to
mitigate against a strategy of offering long-term employment security. In the UK
corporate governance environment, high wages are part of a broader incentive structure
to reward superior individual performance. Thus, in UK pharmaceutical firms, both
scientists and managers receive short-term contracts with no long-term employment
guarantee, considerable scope for individual initiative, and performance-related pay.
20
By contrast, in Germany, while there exist no formal laws stipulating lifetime
employment, German labour has used its power on supervisory boards as well as its
                                               
18   The generalisations on management-employee relations originate from interview evidence from UK
and German pharmaceutical firms.  Lehrer, 1997 forthcoming, undertakes an analysis of internal firm
organsiation in the UK and German civil airline market, and comes to similar conclusions.
19   In order to keep the return on capital high, top management will limit funding for research teams
that do not produce viable candidate compounds in areas with broad commercial appeal (even if the vast
majority are not developed).
20   One of the large UK firms, for example, offered stock options to over 3,200 managers, including
virtually all scientists and financial managers; similar practices were seen at other firms.  Firms also
typically linked a large percentage of pay (up to one third) to yearly performance reviews.13
formal consultative rights under codetermination law over training, work-organisation,
and hiring, to demand unlimited contracts.  Top management has acceded to these
demands for several reasons: i) to secure a cooperative labour force; ii) to lessen the risk
of other firms poaching highly-skilled employees that the firm has trained; and iii)
because German labour law forces firms to pay most of the unemployment insurance for
laid-off workers.  Once the life-time employment norm was established, it spread to
virtually all mid-level managers and technical employees.  Migration of managers and
highly-skilled technical employees across firms is limited, reinforced by the willingness of
German courts to uphold clauses in employment contracts that forbid an employee to
take a job at a different firm with the same skill classification for one year after leaving
the original firm.
Given these constraints on personnel policy, top managers have created very different
organisational structures than exist in UK firms.  German employees receive salaries
defined by their hierarchical position, with pay increases following fixed trajectories
based on seniority and promotion.  Bonuses are typically negotiated into standard
contracts and are not performance related.  Most employees begin careers in technical
positions and at later levels of their career enter into formal management positions.
Rapid promotion is rare.  German firms rely on consensus decision-making across
committees of several managers.
Table 3:  Corporate governance and large firm organisational patterns
Germany United Kingdom
Owners Allows banks to have
industrial shareholdings.
Restrictions on take-overs;






Top Managers Power dispersed across
Vorstand; Aufsichtsrat





linked to firm performance
Decision-making power
concentrated in CEO; non-
executive directors have
little power; high powered
performance incentives;
pay linked to firm
performance












option plans, rapid career
promotion14
This section has shown how differences in corporate governance institutions influence
the type of contracts owners form with top managers and, in turn, the type of contract
top managers create for employees within the firm.  Table 3 summarises these
relationships between corporate governance institutions and firm organisation in the UK
and Germany.
(ii) national systems of innovation
We argued in section two that changes in the nature of bio-medical science necessitates
that large pharmaceutical firms change their research processes.  Instead of performing
most research in-house, it may be that pharmaceutical firms in today’s environment must
create competencies to scan multiple scientific fields and establish numerous alliances
with research firms and university scientists.  While large pharmaceutical firms have,
during the 1990s, developed capacities to scan scientific research programs on a global
level, the national research environment in which they are embedded is crucial.  Having
access to a local and vibrant bio-medical research community lowers the costs of
adjusting to changes in the discovery process.  Experts on biotechnology have
documented a rapid movement of scientists between large pharmaceutical firms, start-up
research ventures, and university labs (Kornberg, 1995; Powell, 1996).  These research
networks are much easier to establish within a firm’s local environment.  Similarly, it may
be argued that large firms can more easily play a role in scanning and, through
supporting graduate training, shaping research at local universities and start-up research
firms than at foreign ones.  If major breakthroughs affecting a firm’s research occur
within the local research environment, it reasons that they can then be monitored more
easily.
A large literature has in recent years examined institutions supporting innovation
processes cross-nationally (see Nelson, 1993).  Drawing in part from these studies, this
section examines differences in the ability of UK and German national innovation systems
to create the organisational competencies necessary to support radical advances in bio-
sciences. In particular, we stress three factors which influence the ability of firms to
support radically innovative research.  These factors are the regulatory environment,
venture capital, and the structure of labour markets and related career incentives. We
consider how these factors operate first in Germany and then in the UK.
Within Germany a number of institutional and regulatory factors have combined with the
labour market policies developed by large firms to produce a hostile climate to the
development of a vibrant small-firm biotechnology sector.  First, for most of the last
decade, German law-makers, in response to widespread social distrust of genetic
research, developed and enforced a regulatory process covering all genetic research.  In
reaction to a widespread perception that German is failing to develop high-technology
industries in a number of areas, the approval process was simplified in 1993, and was15
abolished altogether in 1996.  However, the sum result was that for over a decade, this
law discouraged practically all biotechnology research in Germany (Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 1993; Handelsblatt, 1996a).
Second, Germany’s bank-centred financial system has not fostered the creation of
venture capital pools to support start-up research firms.  Most biotech start-ups in the
US have been funded by the venture capital industry that emerged in the 1970s and
1980s to support the US semiconductor and software industries (Kenney, 1986).
Venture capital is important not just as a means of funding, but also as a critical tool that
managers of start-ups use to create high-powered incentive structures for employees
(Florida and Kenney, 1988).
21  The venture capital system often creates an ideal incentive
structure for employees of biotech firms and provides a mechanism through which start-
up capital is constantly recycled through the industry.
In recent years, German policy-makers and bankers have begun to understood the
importance of venture capital, and the government has organised and given seed-money
to pools of money to support small firms in the biotechnology and other industries
(Handelsblatt, 1996b, 1996c).  The problem, however, is that equity markets are
massively undercapitalised in Germany compared to the US (or UK), and there exists
nothing comparable to the NASDAQ exchange in the US.  As a result, venture capitalists
have no way to quickly liquidate their investments, making it difficult to recycle venture
capital through subsequent rounds of investment.  Additionally, offering employees of
start-ups shares fails to produce a similar high-powered incentive structure, since there is
no chance of an initial public offering for most small German firms.
Third, the career patterns developed by large German pharmaceutical firms, coupled with
‘competition clauses’ within employment contracts, limits the creation of an active
labour market for scientists.  It is difficult for scientists (and other managers) to move
between different firms, since most hiring occurs at the entry level.  Thus, leaving an
established job to work in a start-up is much riskier than in the US and UK, where there
is a large market for managers and scientists of different levels of experience.  In
Germany, a failed venture with a start-up could lead to long-term unemployment.  This
lack of a labour market of entrepreneurial scientists increases the difficulty of fostering a
vibrant community of small, start-up firms backed by venture-capital. Table 4
summarises these arguments.
                                               
21   In most start-up schemes, all employees receive shares in the firm, along with venture capitalists.
Once a firm achieves initial commercial success (or in a biotech firm, develops a compound that can be
licensed), venture capitalists liquidate their shares through an initial public offering.  When successful,
venture capitalists receive a multiple of their initial investments, which are usually invested into
additional start-ups.  Employees can now also sell their shares, often making a large profit.16
Table 4: Influence of National System of Innovation on home market research
Germany United Kingdom
Regulatory environment initially hostile; genetic
technology law created
complex approval process;
law abolished in 1996
Permissive
Venture capital Not well developed;
difficult to support due to
undeveloped equity
markets for small firms
Well-organised venture
capital infrastructure and
equity markets for small
firms
Labour market & career
incentives
Labour market rigidities
and benefits of long-term
employment make joining a
start-up risky
Labour market flexibility
reduces risk of working for
an unsuccessful start-up
As shown in table 4 above, each of these factors previously emphasised is favourable to
the development of radical innovation in the discovery of new drugs in the UK.  The
regulatory climate is permissive.  No special legal regulations affecting genetic research
have been created, and the results of research go through the normal clinical testing and
review process.  High stock market capitalisation fosters the creation of venture capital.
Charitable trusts and private venture capital firms have all been active in fostering start-
up companies in bio-sciences (reference).  Several of the largest universities, including
Cambridge and UCL, have started venture capital funds to create spin-off firms.  Flexible
labour markets reduce the risk of joining firms that face a high probability of failing.
Finally, UK universities quickly adopted the US norms of dividing patent royalties
between researchers, departments, and the university.  This has encouraged the creation
of research communities linking the corporate and scientific communities.  Table 4
summarises these comparisons.
4. Implications for strategy
Recall that as a general point, Table 1 showed that first, there was a substantial rise in
R&D expenditure in the UK between 1983 and 1992.  Also, the absolute levels of R&D
expenditure are approximately the same in the UK and Germany, and yet the UK is
discovering substantially more blockbusters.  Our evidence suggests that the reason that
German firms appear to be ‘less successful’ is a function of a superior response by UK
firms to the new competitive conditions in the global pharmaceutical market, as
described in section 2, both in terms of R&D and marketing/distribution.  We will now
attempt to link this argument to the organisation of firms and the national system of17
innovation.  There are three inter-linked factors: i) owner/ shareholder market pressures;
ii) the ability to create flexible organisational structures; and iii) the impact of the national
system of innovation.
i) owner/shareholder market pressures are becoming increasingly important in the
pharmaceutical industry.  In the UK, dispersed shareholders demand a certain rate of
return on their investment, or it is obvious that either they will sell their stock or not
invest in the firm.  In Germany, the absence of a market for corporate control and the
concentration of company shares across a few large shareholders have muted pressures
from small share-holders for increased short-term returns.  As the competitive pressures
have become more intense in the pharmaceutical industry, due to factors such as
government pressures on the costs of health care, globalisation and increasing R&D
costs (see section 2), pharmaceutical firms have come under more pressure to develop
blockbusters.
22  Research projects must be commercially viable.
In the UK, Zeneca was incorporated (demerger from ICI) in June 1992.  Zeneca focuses
purely on ‘life-sciences’, i.e., pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals.  It was argued
throughout the business press that this was market driven.  The other leading firms in the
UK, Glaxo and Wellcome (before the 1995 merger) are both purely pharmaceutical
manufacturers.  However, for both the leading German firms, Bayer and Hoechst, only a
certain proportion of their sales are in pharmaceuticals.  In 1993,  the proportions were
23% and 24% respectively.  It has been very interesting to note that Hoechst has recently
begun to transform itself into a life sciences group, selling many of its basic and speciality
chemical subsidiaries in order to pay for the take-over of Marion Merrell Dow and
expand its activities in pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals (Handelsblatt, 1996).  It
would appear that the leading German firms are reacting later than the UK firms to
changes in competitive pressures.  This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that
the ability of British shareholders to quickly „punish“ UK firms (through driving the
share price down of poorly performing firms and the unilateral control of the CEO) has
engendered better adaptation to changes in competitive pressures than observed in
Germany.
The major UK firms are investing heavily in PBMs and other after-market firms in order
to obtain better information on market trends, and possibly influence doctor prescription
choices through ‘formulary management’.  This is clearest with SKB, which as a half-US
firm, has been one of the prime movers in this area through its purchase of DPS, one of
the largest PBMs.  Also, Glaxo has formed a long-term marketing alliance with Warner-
Lambert in order to expand its OTC opportunities, and has spun off a drug utilisation
review company (Health Point) in order to obtain doctor prescription information to aid
                                               
22   Grabowski and Vernon (1990, 1994b) show that i) the return to new drugs is highly skewed, a few
‘blockbusters’ dominate the product ranges of the major firms; ii) only the top 30 drugs worldwide cover
average R&D costs.18
its research decisions.
ii) UK firms have also created internal organisational structures to encourage a rapid
response to changes in the market and scientific environment.  Most importantly, the top
management of UK firms linked finance and research departments, which is
accomplished, in part, through linking promotion and bonus opportunities for finance
personnel directly to the commercial success of research.  Financial personnel are directly
involved in research and development decision-making, by being included on all scientific
committees charged with making research decisions.  An additional practice is to train all
lead scientists in management and financial analysis, primarily through sending them to
executive courses within business schools.  As a result, each of the UK firms we visited
had developed extensive expertise in assessing the commercial viability of projects.
Factors such as potential market size and spin-off potential in OTC markets were cited as
central in all research decisions.  Partly as a result of the above, these firms were able to
stop, if it were necessary, the vast majority of all research projects at a very early stage
of development.  One example, widely reported in the press, was the fact that, at the time
of the Glaxo-Wellcome merger, Welcome had as many research projects running as
Glaxo, despite the fact that Wellcome was less than one third the size of Glaxo.
23  This
highlights the success by which shareholder concerns for profitability have been
transferred into organisational practices within Glaxo.
The interview evidence supports the notion that UK firms can move into and out of areas
much more quickly than German firms.  For example, upon deciding to enter into a new
therapeutic area, one of the UK pharmaceutical firms we visited had recently hired not
just a leading biochemist from a nearby university, but his entire research staff.
Department managers in both finance and research also confirmed that firms are unable
to make long-term employment guarantees.  Therefore, if research units have not
achieved sufficient profitability in terms of viable compounds over a period of years, then
they are dismantled, or researchers whose scientific skills have gone out of date are
released.
German firms, by contrast, cannot move into new areas as quickly as UK firms.  This is
in part because of the lack of a market for established scientists within Germany.  New
competencies must be slowly built up through hiring newly trained scientists and, when
possible, reassigning internal scientists into new areas.  Firms are also hesitant to
dedicate resources for what can only be long-term research into new areas in which the
probability of adequate returns is unknown.  German firms can gradually reduce the
work force through early-retirement programs, limiting new-hiring, or selling entire
subsidiaries, but generally cannot lay-off full-time employees within particular
                                               
23   Due to its previous status as a charitable trust, Wellcome faced far less stringent market expectations
than Glaxo.  According to the Economist, Glaxo has since the Wellcome merger laid-off around 7,500
managers and scientists from the combined firm’s staff of 61,500 (Economist, 1997a).19
departments.  In recent years the largest German pharmaceutical firms, Bayer and
Hoechst, have both attempted to increase the number of therapeutic areas within which
they are active.  This mirrors the strategy taken by the largest UK and US firms, and
allows each of these firms to increase its capacity to scan different research programs
occurring within universities and biotech firms.  One probable reason why German firms
have a lower rate of return on R&D (in terms of new blockbuster) is that they cannot
quickly cut research programs that are not producing commercially viable results.
Compared to UK firms, German firms cannot simply decide to lay-off research personnel
dedicated to research programs that are not yielding commercially viable products.
A possible recourse for German firms is to limit research to a small number of
therapeutic areas in which the company has a proven record of success.  This is the
strategy taken by the medium-sized German pharmaceutical firms (Schering and
Boehringer Ingelheim, for example).
24  However, this has the adverse consequence of
limiting the absorptive capacity of the company.  Without a number of ‘platforms’ in
different therapeutic areas, the ability of German firms to scan basic research in biotech
firms and at universities becomes less.  Furthermore, firms with a less varied product
portfolio cannot create an efficient world-wide distribution and marketing network
(which becomes more cost-effective the more drugs the company has to sell).  These
firms may become take-over candidates as a result.
25
iii) differences in the national systems of innovation within UK and German
pharmaceutical firms are embedded have also played a role.  UK firms are embedded
within a vibrant bio-medical research community with a growing infrastructure of biotech
start-up firms. According to a recent survey, over half the biotechnology companies
active in Europe exist in the UK (Economist, 1997b).  UK pharmaceutical firms enjoy
access to a wealth of home market research firms that have been slow to develop in
Germany.
26  This has probably influenced the speed with which UK firms have
incorporated new research methodologies into their own operations, and helped them
quickly establish joint ventures and licensing agreements with biotech firms.
Over recent years German firms have invested large amounts of research and
development funds into biotechnology, but they have had to do this almost entirely
                                               
24   This is not the only factor, of course, for a firm to choose to be present in only a few therapeutic
areas.  Other crucial factors include extremely high unit R&D development costs and lower access to
capital for mid-sized firms.
25   Note that Boehringer Mannheim has just been taken over by Roche (Ch).
26  European biotech has developed primarily within large pharmaceutical firms and in non-profit
institutes such as universities.  This is quite different from the US where there are a lot of start-ups.
There are more UK biotech start-ups than in Germany; one of the reasons is the unusual flotation rules
which have been in place since 1993 and allow biotech firms to be floated on the stock exchange without
the usual three years record of trading profits.  However, the number of German biotech start-ups has
been increasing recently due to changes in the genetic engineering law, and the government actively
promoting the biotech industry (Financial Times, 26/11/96).20
abroad.  This is particularly true with the largest German firms, in particular Hoechst and
Bayer.  Hoechst, for example, now spends over 60% of its total research and
development abroad, and has 90 overseas R&D centres (Handelsblatt, 1996).  It has
transferred most of its biotechnology research to US labs acquired during the take-over
of Marion Merrell Dow, now spending about DM 400 million per year on biotechnology
(Wirtschaftswoche, 1997).  According to Sharp and Patel (1996), Hoechst and Bayer
each have over a dozen different biotechnology collaborations with universities and
biotech firms in the United States.  Bayer has one dedicated biotechnology lab in
Germany, while Hoechst has none.
5.  Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed differences in corporate governance institutions and the
national system of innovation in Germany and the UK, and how these differences
impacted the firms’ organisational structure and ability to take advantage of changing
technologies.  UK firms rapidly developed new competencies in research, marketing and
distribution, outperforming their German competitors during the 1980s.  We credit this
superior response to national institutional frameworks in the areas of corporate
governance and the innovation system.  UK corporate governance institutions give an
advantage in developing rapidly changing product market strategies necessitated by
structural market changes.  Due to share-holder pressures linked to ownership structure
and organisational flexibility, the UK pharmaceutical firms reacted more quickly than
their German rivals to changed competitive conditions.  Similarly, the national system of
innovation encourages radical innovation; UK pharmaceutical firms were able to easily
tap into these research communities.
Our findings must be situated within the broader findings by Porter (1990) and others
who document strong cross-national variation in the product market strategies firms
successfully pursue.  The Germans appear to be particularly successful within industries
necessitating long-term capital investment, access to highly skilled workers, long-term
managerial employment with relatively low-powered remuneration incentives, and in-
house research and development.  A large literature has emphasised the German success
in industrial machinery, automobiles, specialty chemicals, etc., – all sectors in which the
very „short-termism“ that proves so successful in extremely turbulent markets has
undermined UK firm performance (see Katzenstein, 1989, Streeck, 1992).
Furthermore, we observe that the leading German pharmaceutical firms have, in recent
years, strongly reacted to the changing industry dynamics.  As discussed above, the
majority of value-added within pharmaceuticals consists not in discovery, but
development and marketing and distribution.  German pharmaceutical firms, lead by
Hoechst, have created elaborate international production chains during the 1990s.  The21
leading firms have spent billions of dollars creating research and development networks
in biotechnology.  However, in contrast with the UK firms, this money has not been
invested in the domestic market, but primarily in overseas networks, accessing the US
science base.  Compounds developed abroad can be easily transferred back to Germany,
where further development may ensue.
This leads to a powerful argument against those arguing that globalisation must lead to a
convergence of institutional frameworks (Ohame, 1991).  German firms are adjusting to
changes in the pharmaceutical industry, but not through attempting to reconfigure
German corporate governance or innovation institutions (if indeed, that were possible).
In this case, German firms are embracing globalisation, but are continuing to invest
within the national economies where the organisational competencies for each part of the
value-chain may most easily be created.22
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